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EAR VS. DBSI: A BATTLE ROYALE OVER SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY AND 11 U.S.C. § 544(B)(1)
Collin Hart

I. INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy process is one of the foundational aspects of the
modern American economic and financial system. As businesses are
bound to fail, any successful economic system needs a process to deal
with such failures. Modern bankruptcy proceedings provide insolvent
debtors a dignified and structured process to settle their debts and
continue life without complete financial destruction. The central purpose
of the bankruptcy proceeding is to ensure the fair and equal distribution
of the debtor’s assets among all entitled creditors.1 In order to effectuate
this process, federal bankruptcy law bestows special powers upon the
bankruptcy trustee (and a debtor-in-possession), who is tasked with
creating the order in which entitled creditors will be paid after the
proceeding. One of the powers is the avoidance power.2
The avoidance power allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid or unwind
certain property transfers by the debtor that occurred prior to the filing of
bankruptcy.3 The purpose of the avoidance power is to maximize the
bankruptcy estate and to prevent debtors from depleting the resources and
property available to the entitled creditors immediately prior to filing for
bankruptcy.4 The avoidance power of federal bankruptcy law is codified
in several sections of the Bankruptcy Code,5 including in 11 U.S.C. §
544.6 Recently, a circuit split has developed regarding the ability of a
bankruptcy trustee to bring an 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) derivative, state-lawbased avoidance action against the federal government.7 While sovereign
immunity would normally bar such an action, 11 U.S.C. § 106 broadly
waives sovereign immunity for large sections of the Bankruptcy Code––

1. See infra Section II(a)(1).
2. See infra Section II(a)(2).
3. See infra Section II(a)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 544.
4. See infra Section II(a)(2).
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.
6. See infra Section II(a)(2).
7. See In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc., 742 F.3d. 743 (7th Cir. 2014); In re DBSI,
Inc., 869 F.3d. 1004 (9th Cir. 2017). In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc. and In re DBSI, Inc.
address a near identical fact pattern in which a bankruptcy trustee (or the equivalent debtor-in-possession)
attempted to use 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) to avoid federal income tax payments that the corporation made
to the IRS prior to bankruptcy. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits created a circuit split after arriving at
opposite conclusions as to 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)’s effect on 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), and whether 11 U.S.C. §
544(b)(1) actions against the federal government were barred by sovereign immunity.
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including 11 U.S.C. § 544.8
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have disagreed as to how 11 U.S.C. §
106’s waiver of sovereign immunity should apply to avoidance actions
brought against the federal government under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).9
This Article explores the split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and
concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 106’s waiver serves to alter the baseline
requirements necessary to bring an action under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
Thus, 11 U.S.C. § 106 completely removes the sovereign immunity
barrier for such actions and allows a bankruptcy trustee to bring a 11
U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) action against the federal government.10
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I contains background
information on the bankruptcy proceeding, 11 U.S.C. § 544, 11 U.S.C. §
106, and the two Circuit Court decisions at issue. Part II discusses the
proper interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 106 as it applies to 11 U.S.C. §
544(b)(1) actions. Finally, Part III provides a brief overview and
conclusion as to the proper interpretation of 11 U.S.C. §§ 106 and
544(b)(1).
II. BACKGROUND
This Part proceeds in six sections. Sections A and B overview the
bankruptcy process, the avoidance power, 11 U.S.C. § 106, and 11 U.S.C.
§ 544. Section C then briefly outlines the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Then, Sections D and E review the two circuit decisions at issue: In re
Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.11 and In re DBSI, Inc.12 Finally,
Section F briefly describes the In re Paloma Generating Company13 line
of cases that have challenged the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 106.
A. Bankruptcy: Background
1. Bankruptcy Proceedings
Bankruptcy serves to mitigate the effects of financial failure. The
8. See infra Section II(b)(2).
9. The Seventh Circuit, in Equipment Acquisition Resources, held that 11 U.S.C. § 106’s waiver
did not apply to the underlying state law upon which an 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) action was brought, and
therefore sovereign immunity barred a bankruptcy trustee from bringing an 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) action
against the IRS. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in DBSI, held that 11 U.S.C. § 106’s waiver applied to the
underlying state law upon which an 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) action, and therefore a bankruptcy trustee could
bring an 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) action against the IRS. See infra Part II.
10. In re DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. 1004.
11. 742 F.3d. 743.
12. 869 F.3d. 1004.
13. 588 B.R. 695 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018).
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purpose of the bankruptcy proceeding is to rearrange the rights and
liabilities between a debtor and its creditors, and to provide a single
proceeding to control and distribute the assets and property of the debtor
among all entitled creditors.14 More specifically, bankruptcy proceedings
seek to prioritize creditors and ensure that creditors of equal priority
receive equal treatment through the fair and equitable distribution of the
debtor’s assets.15 Therefore, three central goals of bankruptcy are (1) to
identify and control all property interests of the debtor, (2) distribute the
debtor’s assets equitably among all creditors, and (3) maximize the
benefit available to all entitled creditors.16
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate.17
The bankruptcy estate is a separate entity from the debtor18 and generally
includes all non-exempt property in which the debtor had an interest as of
the date of the filing for bankruptcy.19 As discussed in this Article, the
estate may also be comprised of property interests that a debtor transferred
to a third-party prior to filing for bankruptcy.20
The bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court,21 a representative of
the estate, and a representative of all the estate’s unsecured creditors.22
The primary duty of the bankruptcy trustee is to collect, liquidate, and
distribute estate property.23 In certain types of bankruptcy cases, the
debtor in bankruptcy functions as a “debtor-in-possession” and serves the
role of the bankruptcy trustee.24
2. The Avoidance Power
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee has the power to
avoid (or invalidate) certain property transfers made by the debtor.25 A
“transfer” for bankruptcy purposes can be many things, including any (1)
creation of a lien; (2) retention of title as a security interest; (3) foreclosure
of a debtor's equity of redemption; or (4) parting with any property or an
interest in property.26 If the trustee successfully avoids a transfer made by
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 1 (2019).
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2018).
8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 2 (2019).
Id. §547.
Id.
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §1.03.
See infra Section II(a)(2).
8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 247.
Id. § 248.
Id.
Id. § 288.
Id. § 664.
11 U.S.C. §101(54) (Current through P.L. 116-5).
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the bankrupt party, the recovered property consequently becomes a part
of the bankruptcy estate and is available for distribution among
creditors.27 The avoidance power seeks to prevent a debtor from
intentionally depleting the resources and property available to bankruptcy
creditors immediately prior to bankruptcy by transferring its assets.28 The
avoidance power therefore serves to maximize the bankruptcy estate and
allow recovery for all creditors.29
B. Bankruptcy: Selected Statutory Provisions
1. 11 U.S.C. § 54430
11 U.S.C. § 544 (Section 544) vests a bankruptcy trustee with the
“strong-arm avoidance powers” that allow him to avoid certain property
transfers.31 Although Section 544(a) and (b) allow the trustee to avoid
different types of transfers, both sections have the same goal: maximize
the estate and equalize the distribution of a debtor’s assets among
creditors of the same class.32
Section 544(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that a trustee “may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation
incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a
creditor.”33 The general consensus is that Section 544(b)(1) confers upon
the bankruptcy trustee no greater rights of avoidance than a creditor would
have if the creditor asserted the claim, on its own behalf, outside of
bankruptcy.34 Thus, the general rule is that if a creditor outside of
bankruptcy would be estopped from recovery under applicable law, a
bankruptcy trustee is likewise estopped or barred per Section 544(b)(1).35
This general rule is commonly referred to as the “actual creditor”
requirement or the “triggering creditor” requirement.36
2. 11 U.S.C. § 10637
11 U.S.C. § 106 (“Section 106”) acts as a broad wavier of sovereign
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 664.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 544 (Current through P.L. 116-5).
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, § 544.01.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (Current through P.L. 115-281) (emphasis added).
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §544.06.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 106 (Current through P.L. 116-5).
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immunity for large sections of the Bankruptcy Code.38 Congress first
attempted to abrogate sovereign immunity in certain bankruptcy contexts
when it adopted the first version of Section 106 in 1978.39 In 1994,
Congress amended Section 106 to further clarify its intent to waive
sovereign immunity and the scope of its waiver after the Supreme Court
twice challenged40 the clarity and constitutionality of the previous version
of Section 106.41 To remedy these challenges, current Section 106(a), as
amended, lists the sections of the Bankruptcy Code to which sovereign
immunity is abrogated.42
Section 106(a) does not completely eliminate sovereign immunity
under the Bankruptcy Code;43 rather, Congress chose to exclude various
sections of the Bankruptcy Code, including 11 U.S.C. § 54144 (Section
541), from Section 106(a)’s list of affected sections.45 Thus, government
defendants are still permitted to assert sovereign immunity in select,
enumerated circumstances, including against suits brought under Section
541.46
C. Sovereign Immunity
Under the American governmental system, the federal government and
all individual states remain sovereign entities, and, according to the
Supreme Court, it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty that sovereign
entities are not amenable to suit by an individual without the sovereign’s
consent. 47 Thus, federal and state governmental bodies are immune from
suit by an individual except when their immunity has been either
abrogated by Congress, waived by some action taken by the governmental

38. See id.
39. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §106.01.
40. Id.; see also Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989);
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
41. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §106.01.
42. Id. Section 106(a) provides in relevant part, that:
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit … with respect to the following:
sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523,
524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 744, 749,
764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227,
1231, 1301. 1303. 1305, and 1237 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (Current through P.L. 115-281) (emphasis added).
43. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §106.04.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Current through P.L. 116-5) (Section 541 largely applies to pre-bankruptcy
petition causes of action).
45. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §106.04.
46. Id.
47. Id. §106.01.
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body, or eliminated by a specific provision of the Constitution itself.48 A
valid congressional waiver of sovereign immunity must satisfy two
requirements:49 (1) Congress must have “unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate the immunity[,]”50 and (2) Congress must have acted
“pursuant to a valid exercise of power.”51
D. In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.52
1. Background
On February 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided In
re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.53 (EAR).54 In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit became the first Circuit Court to address the question of
whether Section 106(a)’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied to the
underlying state law upon which a Section 544(b)(1) claim was brought.55
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Section 106(a)’s waiver did not apply
to the underlying state law and therefore a bankruptcy trustee (or debtorin-possession) was barred from bringing a Section 544(b)(1) action
against the IRS.56
EAR concerned an Illinois corporation in bankruptcy.57 During its
operation, the corporation made several federal income tax payments to
the IRS on behalf of the corporation’s shareholders.58 Once in bankruptcy,
the Illinois corporation (as a debtor-in-possession) filed several advisory
actions against the federal government to recover some of the tax
payments made.59 Among other actions, the Illinois corporation brought
a Section 544(b)(1) action against the IRS via Illinois’s version of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).60 In support of its action, the
Illinois corporation argued that the Bankruptcy Code’s abrogation of
sovereign immunity, under Section 106(a)(1), precluded the IRS from
claiming immunity.61
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, §106.01.
Id.
742 F.3d. 743 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744-45.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While the government agreed to disgorge most of the tax payments, the
government contested the Illinois corporation’s ability to recover the final
payment under Section 544(b)(1).62 The government argued that as
sovereign immunity ordinarily prevented a creditor outside of bankruptcy
from bringing an Illinois UFTA action against the IRS, the final payment
was not avoidable under 544(b)(1) because it was not “voidable under
[the] applicable law.”63 The bankruptcy court rejected this argument
holding that Congress intended Section 106(a)’s “general waiver” of
immunity to include state-law-based causes of action available under
Section 544(b)(1).64 The court grounded its conclusion in “[t]he plain,
unambiguous language of § 106,” the deliberate inclusion of Section
544 within Section 106(a), and policy considerations favoring greater
recovery for the benefit of all creditors.65
The government appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s ruling.66 The district court framed the dispute as
“whether § 544(b), which explicitly limits a trustee's ability to avoid a
transfer, overrides § 106(a)'s abrogation of sovereign immunity.”67 The
district court agreed with the bankruptcy court that Section 106's
“complete abolishment” of sovereign immunity carried the day stating
that, “[i]t simply does not matter how a sovereign immunity defense is
invoked” because “106(a)(1) simply eliminates [that] obstacle wherever
it appears ‘with respect to’ § 544.”68
2. Issue and Statutory Construction
In overturning the district court, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis
with the text and structure of Section 544(b)(1).69 The Seventh Circuit
noted that unlike other Bankruptcy Code sections that authorize a cause
of action, Section 544(b)(1) did not provide a direct cause of action.70
Instead, Section 544(b)(1) provides a derivative cause of action that
allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers that are voidable under
other applicable laws.71 In the Seventh Circuit’s view, Section 544(b)(1)
only enables a trustee in bankruptcy to do what a traditional creditor could

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id.
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do outside of bankruptcy.72 Therefore, if no creditor exists that could void
the transfer in question outside of bankruptcy, the trustee is powerless to
act under Section 544(b)(1).73 In other words, the bankruptcy trustee
stands in the shoes of an actual unsecured creditor (outside of bankruptcy)
and if the actual creditor could not succeed—whether due to the statute of
limitations, estoppel, res judicata, waiver, or any other defense—then the
bankruptcy trustee is similarly barred and cannot avoid the transfer.74
Based on this analysis of Section 544(b)(1), the Seventh Circuit framed
the issue as whether Section 106(a)(1)’s abrogation of sovereign
immunity allows a bankruptcy trustee to bring a state-law fraudulenttransfer suit against the federal government even though, outside of
bankruptcy, sovereign immunity would bar a non-bankruptcy creditor
from bringing such a claim.75 In holding that Section 106(a)(1) confers no
such right, the Seventh Circuit primarily relied upon its view as to the
proper statutory interpretation of Section 544(b)(1).76
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the lower courts “focused too
narrowly” on the language of Section 106 and “largely disregarded” the
substantive requirements of Section 544.77 While the Seventh Circuit
agreed that the language of Section 106 is clear and unambiguous, the
court argued that the crux of the issue was the language of Section
544(b)(1).78 In the court’s view, Congress did not alter the substantive
requirements of Section 544(b)(1) merely by stating, in Section 106, that
the federal government’s sovereign immunity was abrogated with respect
to Section 544.79 Therefore, Section 544(b)(1) continued to require a
party bringing a 544(b)(1) action to show that a creditor outside of
bankruptcy could have succeed on a similar action brought under the
applicable state law even after the enactment of Section 106.80 In the
court’s view, because Congress had not abrogated sovereign immunity
for the Illinois UFTA, no creditor outside of bankruptcy could sue the IRS
under the Illinois UFTA. Thus, the Illinois corporation’s 544(b)(1) action
was barred because the tax payment was not “voidable under applicable
law.”81

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. The Rejected Counter-Arguments
After declaring its view as to the proper interpretation of Section
544(b)(1), the Seventh Circuit rejected several counter arguments.82 First,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that Congress knowingly
included state-law-based causes of action within the category of suits to
which a sovereign immunity defense could no longer be asserted “[b]y
including § 544 in the list of Bankruptcy Code sections set forth in §
106(a).”83 The Seventh Circuit concluded that inferred congressional
intent cannot trump a provision’s clear and unambiguous text.84
Therefore, because the Seventh Circuit viewed the substantive
requirements of Section 544(b)(1) as clear and unaltered by Section 106,
the Seventh Circuit viewed any arguments based upon Congressional
intent as moot.85
Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that its holding
would render Section 106’s abrogation of immunity meaningless with
respect to Section 544.86 The Seventh Circuit noted that Section 106 does
not only abrogate sovereign immunity with respect to the federal
government, but also abrogates immunity with respect to state and local
governments.87 Thus, in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, if a state waived
its immunity to UFTA actions, Section 106 would allow a bankruptcy
trustee to bring a 544(b)(1) action against that state based upon the state’s
UFTA.88
The Seventh Circuit also noted that subsection (b)(1) is only one subpart of Section 544, and that the court’s holding would not affect Section
106’s effect on the remainder of Section 544, including subsection (a).89
The Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by the argument that if Congress
only intended Section 106 to apply to certain portions of 544, it would
have drafted its reference to Section 544 more specifically.90
4. Policy Considerations
Finally, the Seventh Circuit invoked several policy considerations in
support of its holding.91 First, the Seventh Circuit raised concerns about
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 747-50.
Id. at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 750.
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exposing the federal government to liability based upon state laws, the
dimensions of which Congress does not control.92 Second, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that its holding was more consistent with the judicial
presumption in favor of the government in sovereign immunity
questions.93 The court noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
warned against interpretations that “expand the scope of the government’s
liability beyond the point where its consent is unequivocal.”94 Therefore,
the courts should limit sovereign immunity in situations like this, where
a plausible interpretation of a provision exists that would preserve
immunity.95
E. In re DBSI, Inc.96
1. Background
On August 31, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided In re
DBSI, Inc.97 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit became the second circuit court
to address the question of whether Congress’s waiver of sovereign
immunity under Section 106(a)98 extends to the underlying “applicable
law” of a Section 544(b)(1) action.99 In deciding that Section 106(a)’s
waiver of sovereign immunity applied to the underlying state law of a
Section 544(b)(1) action, the Ninth Circuit directly contradicted the
Seventh Circuit100 in a case with almost identical facts.101
In re DBSI, Inc.102 (“DBSI”) concerned an Idaho corporation in
bankruptcy.103 Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the corporation made several
income tax payments to the IRS on behalf of its shareholders.104 Shortly
after filing for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee (“DBSI Trustee”) was
appointed and commenced a proceeding to recover the allegedly
fraudulent tax payments to the IRS.105 The DBSI Trustee relied in part

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. 1004 (9th Cir. 2017).
869 F.3d. 1004.
11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1).
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1); DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. at 1007.
See Equipment Acquisition Resources, 742 F.3d. at 743; supra Section II(d).
See DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. at 1006-07; Equipment Acquisition Resources, 742 F.3d. at 1010.
DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. at 1004.
Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id.
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upon Section 544(b)(1) to bring its claim against the IRS.106
At trial, the government moved to dismiss the Section 544(b)(1) action
by arguing that Section 106(a)(1) did not apply to the Idaho UFTA––the
underlying applicable law upon which the DBSI Trustee brought its
Section 544(b)(1) action.107 Therefore, because the federal government
had not separately waived sovereign immunity with regard to Idaho’s
UFTA, no creditor outside of bankruptcy existed who could sue the IRS
under Idaho’s UFTA. Thus, the government argued that the actualcreditor requirement of Section 544(b)(1) was not satisfied.108 The
Bankruptcy Court rejected the government’s position, holding that
Section 106’s waiver did apply to Idaho’s UFTA, and thus sovereign
immunity did not bar the Section 544(b)(1) action.109 The district court
affirmed and the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 110 While the
appeal was pending, the Seventh Circuit decided EAR.
2. Statutory Interpretation
In holding that sovereign immunity did not bar the DBSI Trustee’s
544(b)(1) action, the Ninth Circuit relied primary upon the text, structure,
and interplay of Sections 544(b)(1) and 106.111
First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that its holding was supported by a
holistic view of the provisions at issue.112 The court noted that proper
statutory construction is a “holistic endeavor” that relies upon context to
be a “preliminary determinate of meaning.”113 Thus, a court must look not
only to the particular statutory language at issue, but also to the “language
and design of the statute as a whole.”114 Based upon these principles, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that it could not properly analyze the text and
requirements of Section 544(b)(1) without considering Section 106’s
abrogation of sovereign immunity.115
With this interpretive structure, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Section 106(a)(1)’s “unequivocal” waiver “completely” abolished
sovereign immunity “wherever it appear[ed] ‘with respect to Section
544,” and that such waiver “necessarily include[d] the derivative state law

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1008.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1009-16.
Id. at 1010.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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claim” upon which a 544(b)(1) action was brought.116 Therefore, the
interplay between Sections 106 and 544(b)(1) could only be interpreted
one way: to succeed on a Section 544(b)(1) claim, a trustee “need only
identify an unsecured creditor, who, but for sovereign immunity, could
bring an avoidance action against the IRS.”117
Second, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Section 106(a)(1) was
enacted after Section 544(b)(1).118 Thus, when Congress waived
sovereign immunity with respect to Section 544(b)(1), it understood that
Section 544(b)(1) codified a trustee’s right to invoke state law.119 In the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, because Congress is presumed to understand the
state of existing law when it legislates, it was clear that Congress
“knowingly included state law causes of action within the category of
suits to which a sovereign immunity defense could no longer be asserted”
by including Section 544 within Section 106’s waiver.120
Third, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that adopting the government’s
position would “essentially nullify Section 106(a)(1)’s effect on Section
544(b)(1)” because a trustee would always need to demonstrate that
Congress provided a separate waiver of sovereign immunity for the
underlying “applicable law” of a Section 544(b)(1) claim.121 In the court’s
view, this conclusion would violate the basic rule of statutory
construction that one provision should not be interpreted in a way which
is internally contradictory or that renders other provisions of the same
statute meaningless.122
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the counterargument that the
government’s argued interpretation would not render Section 106’s effect
on Section 544 completely meaningless because Section 106 would still
apply to Section 544(a).123 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, if Congress
intended to limit Section 106’s effect on Section 544 to subsection (a), it
would have specifically referenced section 544(a), and not section 544
generally, in the text of Section 106.124
3. Policy Considerations
The Ninth Circuit further grounded its holding in the equitable

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1010-11.
Id. at 1010 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1011-12.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
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principles and policies that underlie federal bankruptcy law.125 It noted
that prior to the enactment of Section 106, the Bankruptcy Code’s
treatment of governmental entities was inherently inequitable because the
government was both able to participate in the distributions of a
bankruptcy case but was also shielded from liability via sovereign
immunity.126 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, Congress enacted Section
106 so as to place governmental creditors on more equal footing with all
other bankruptcy creditors.127 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s holding, at
least in its view, more properly aligned with Congressional intent and the
underlying principles of bankruptcy law by ensuring more equitable
distribution of the debtor’s property among all entitled creditors.128
F. In re Paloma Generating Company129 and Related Cases
In re Paloma Generating Company130 and a handful of other
decisions131 have raised issue with the constitutionality of Section 106
regarding its effect on state and local governments. In re Paloma
concerned a California energy company in bankruptcy.132 The
Bankruptcy trustee brought bankruptcy actions against several state
agencies to avoid certain property tax payments.133 In response, the state
agency raised a sovereign immunity defense.134 In finding for the state
agency, the bankruptcy court held Section 106’s waiver of sovereign
immunity—as it applies to state and local governments—
unconstitutional.135
III. DISCUSSION
The central question addressed in this Part is whether a trustee (or
debtor-in-possession) can bring a Section 544(b)(1) action against the
federal government. More specifically, whether Section 106’s waiver of
sovereign immunity applies to the underlying “applicable law” of a
125. Id. at 1015-16.
126. Id. at 1016.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 588 B.R. 695.
130. Id.
131. See In re Patriot Coal Corp., 562 B.R. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016); In re Philadelphia Entm’t
and Dev. Partners, L.P., 549 B.R. 103 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016); In re Sarfani, Inc., 527 B.R. 241 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 2015).
132. 588 B.R. at 701, 703.
133. Id. at 701.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 734-35.
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Section 544(b)(1) action such that no additional waiver specific to the
“applicable law” at issue is required to bring a 544(b)(1) action against
the federal government. This Article argues that Section 106’s waiver
flows through Section 544(b)(1) and applies to the underlying applicable
law in bankruptcy proceedings such that a trustee can bring a Section
544(b)(1) against the federal government. In essence, Section 106 alters
the requirements necessary to bring a 544(b)(1) action. Therefore, a
bankruptcy trustee (or debtor-in-possession) can bring a Section
544(b)(1) action against the IRS based upon a state’s UFTA. This
conclusion is based upon the proper statutory interpretation of Sections
544(b)(1) and 106, congressional intent behind both statutes, practical and
functional considerations, and acting in furtherance of the central
purposes of federal bankruptcy law. Finally, it is important to note that
while In re Paloma Generating Company136 and other decisions137 have
raised issue with the constitutionality of Section 106, such decisions have
no effect on this Article.138
This Part proceeds in three sections. First, this Part discusses the proper
statutory interpretation of Sections 106 and 544(b)(1). Second, this Part
addresses the proper use of congressional intent in the analysis of Sections
106’s effect on 544(b)(1). Finally, this Part explores how practical and
policy considerations support the conclusion of this Article that Section
106’s waiver flows through Section 544(b)(1) and applies to the
underlying applicable law in bankruptcy proceedings such that a trustee
can bring a Section 544(b)(1) against the federal government.
A. Statutory Interpretation
As a matter of proper statutory construction, Section 106’s abrogation
of sovereign immunity applies to the underlying law of a Section
544(b)(1) action and therefore acts to alter the requirements necessary to
bring a Section 544(b)(1) action. The Ninth Circuit is correct in stating
that Section 106’s effect on Section 544(b)(1) is such that a trustee “need
only identify an unsecured creditor, who, but for sovereign immunity,
136. Id. at 695.
137. See In re Patriot Coal Corp., 562 B.R. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016); In re Philadelphia Entm’t
and Dev. Partners, L.P., 549 B.R. 103 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016); In re Sarfani, Inc., 527 B.R. 241 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 2015).
138. See, e.g., Paloma, 588 B.R. at 695. Paloma and other related cases, have begun to attack the
constitutionality of Section 106. Specifically, these cases assert that Section 106’s waiver of state
sovereign immunity is unconstitutional. See id. at 695; Patriot, 562 B.R. at 632; Philadelphia Entm’t, 549
B.R. at 103; Sarfani, 527 B.R. at 241. The argument expressed in Paloma is irrelevant for this analysis
because this Article concerns the applicability of Section 106’s waiver of sovereign immunity in actions
brought against the federal government. Because no case, including Paloma, challenges Congress’ ability
to waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity, no constitutional questions surround Section 106
as it applies for this discussion.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss2/8

14

Hart: EAR vs. DBSI: A Battle Royale

2020]

EAR VS. DBSI: A BATTLE ROYALE

629

could bring an avoidance action against” the federal government.139 This
conclusion is based on a holistic view of the Bankruptcy Code and a desire
to avoid rendering part of Section 106 meaningless.
First, the Ninth Circuit properly stated that statutory construction
requires a holistic approach. Statutory construction does not end with an
isolated analysis of the specific provisions at issue, but must also analyze
each provision at issue within the context of the entire statute of which it
is a part. Therefore, to properly analyze the question at issue, a court must
both analyze and understand the language and requirements of Section
544(b)(1) and analyze how other sections of the Bankruptcy Code—
namely Section 106—alter or effect those requirements.
Under this approach, analysis of the issue in question should begin with
the text of Section 544(b)(1). Section 544(b)(1) simply states that a trustee
may “avoid any transfer” that is “voidable under applicable law.”140 A
plain reading of this language indicates that a transfer is avoidable in
bankruptcy if that transfer is also voidable under applicable law. If a
court’s statutory analysis were to stop at this juncture, the question of
whether a Section 544(b)(1) action can be brought under a state’s UFTA
would be simple—unless the federal government had specifically waived
sovereign immunity with regard to the UFTA at issue, sovereign
immunity would still remain a barrier and a Section 544(b)(1) action
would be barred. But, as the Ninth Circuit accurately highlights, analysis
of the issue does not end solely with the text of Section 544(b)(1).
After considering the “voidable under applicable law” requirement of
Section 544(b)(1), a court must consider how Section 106 alters this
language. Section 106 plainly states that sovereign immunity is abrogated
with respect to the listed sections, one of which is the entirety of Section
544.141 Because Section 106 is a valid wavier of sovereign immunity,142
the correct interpretive result is that Section 106 acts to remove the
procedural barrier of sovereign immunity for any action brought under
the listed sections––including Section 544(b)(1). More simply stated,
Section 106 alters the baseline requirements necessary to bring a
544(b)(1) action by removing the procedural hurdle of sovereign
immunity.
The recognition of Section 106’s effect on Section 544(b)(1) is where
the two Circuits diverge. The Ninth Circuit appropriately concludes that

139. In re DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
142. Both the Ninth and Seventh Circuit agree that Section 106’s waiver of immunity is clear and
unambiguous. Therefore, both courts agree that Section 106 meets the Supreme Court’s standard for an
effective waiver of sovereign immunity. DBSI, Inc., 869 F.3d. at 1013; In re Equipment Acquisition
Resources, Inc., 742 F.3d. 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2014).
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because Section 106’s wavier is clear, unambiguous, and applies to
Section 544(b)(1) actions, Section 106 should be read as modifying the
requirements necessary to bring a Section 544(b)(1) action. Essentially,
the language of Section 544(b)(1) should be read in conjunction with the
language of Section 106. When the two provisions are read in
conjunction, the substantive requirements of a Section 544(b)(1) action
change from “… any transfer that is voidable under applicable law” to “…
[except with regard to issues of sovereign immunity,] any transfer that is
voidable under applicable law.”
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit concludes that while Section 106’s
waiver is clear, unambiguous, and applies to Section 544(b)(1), it is
practically meaningless with respect to Section 544(b)(1) actions.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion abides by the cannon of
statutory construction against interpretations that hold part of a statute
meaningless143 by interpreting Section 106’s waiver to fully apply to each
applicable subsection of Section 544. Conversely, the Seventh’s Circuit’s
opinion renders Section 106’s waiver essentially meaningless with
respect to Section 544(b)(1). In the Seventh Circuit’s view, to comply
with the actual creditor requirement of 544(b)(1), Congress must grant a
separate, specific wavier of immunity for the underlying “applicable law”
of a 544(b)(1) action. If this interpretation is correct, Section 106’s waiver
is meaningless with respect to Section 544(b)(1) because the separate,
“applicable law” specific waiver would eliminate sovereign immunity for
claims brought both in and outside of bankruptcy. Thus, the result of the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is that Section 106’s waiver is both
insufficient to remove the sovereign immunity barrier for 544(b)(1)
actions and also ultimately unnecessary in the face of a separate,
“applicable law” specific waiver.
The Seventh Circuit provides two arguments to defend against claims
that its holding renders part of Section 106 meaningless. First, it argues
that the waiver of immunity could still apply to other governmental units
besides the federal government. Thus, for example, if Illinois waived
sovereign immunity to actions brought under its UFTA, Section 106
would allow a bankruptcy trustee to bring a Section 544(b)(1) action
against Illinois based on Illinois’ UFTA. But, this defense does nothing
to resolve claims that the Seventh Circuit’s holding renders part of Section
106 meaningless because such argument still concludes that Section 106’s
waiver is insufficient by itself and a separate, “applicable law” specific
wavier is needed to bring a Section 544(b)(1) action. But, as stated above,
143. See e.g., United States v. Powell, 6 F.3d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that one provision should not be interpreted in a way which is internally contradictory or that
renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent or meaningless.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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if the government granted a waiver specific to the underlying applicable
law in question, under the Seventh Circuit’s view of the actual creditor
requirement, such waiver would suffice to eliminate the sovereign
immunity barrier for Section 544(b)(1) actions as well. Again, the result
is that Section 106’s waiver is both insufficient for Section 544(b)(1)
actions and ultimately meaningless. Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s first
defense is flawed.
The Seventh Circuit’s second defense argues that its holding does not
render Section 106’s effect on Section 544 meaningless because Section
106 could still apply to Section 544(a). But, if Congress intended for
Section 106 to only apply to 544(a)––and not 544(b)––Congress would
have specified such intent in the text of Section 106. Congress would have
listed Section 544(a) and not Section 544 in its entirety in the text of
Section 106. Furthermore, by omitting Section 541 from Section 106,
Congress clearly showed that it was selective and specific in determining
to which parts of the Bankruptcy Code Section 106 should apply. But, the
Seventh Circuit argues that Congress simply listed full sections in the text
of Section 106 for drafting convenience. But such a conclusion should not
overcome the logical presumption that Congress intended Section 106 to
apply to all applicable subsections within the list of affected sections. The
Seventh Circuit also tries to strengthen its argument by noting that Section
106’s list of affected sections contains subsections to which a waiver of
sovereign immunity would have no effect–subsections that do not
authorize a cause of action; but, Section 544 is listed in its entirety.
Therefore, that reasoning cannot support the position that Section 106
applies to one subsection of Section 544 but not another.
In conclusion, while the Seventh Circuit is correct that the language
and requirements of Section 544(b)(1) are unambiguous when read in
isolation, proper statutory interpretation of the question does not end with
the plain language of Section 544(b)(1). Instead, proper interpretation of
Section 544(b)(1) must also consider the interplay between the language
of Section 544 and Section 106, and how Section 106 may alter, affect, or
qualify the requirements of Section 544(b)(1). In this regard the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis falls short and succumbs to the very critique it lobbies
against other courts: it focuses too narrowly on the language of one
specific section rather than all the sections at play.
B. Analysis of Congressional Intent
While holding that Section 106’s waiver alters the requirements of a
Section 544(b)(1) action is correct based upon a holistic view of statutory
interpretation, this holding is further strengthened by a simple analysis of
Congressional intent. When viewing the language and history of Section
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106, Congress’s intent becomes quite clear: to broadly and completely
eradicate the sovereign immunity defense within large sections of the
Bankruptcy Code.
The history of Section 106 supports a conclusion that Congress
intended Section 106’s wavier to apply as broadly as possible, including
to Section 544(b)(1) actions. The original version of Section 106 came
under repeated attacks and eventually the Supreme Court held it
unconstitutional.144 Congress could have simply scrapped the section and
proceeded to allow the federal government to claim immunity in the
bankruptcy context. Congress could have also narrowed or limited the
waiver at this point. Instead, Congress chose to amend and reenact
Section 106,145 thereby reaffirming its intention to waive sovereign
immunity for the enumerated bankruptcy actions. This shows a clear
desire by Congress to eliminate the sovereign immunity defense for all
the listed sections.
Also, the broad but specific language of Section 106 supports a
conclusion that Congress intended Section 106’s wavier to apply to
Section 544(b)(1) actions. While the Seventh Circuit attempts to attack
the general section listings of Section 106, such general listings actually
strengthen the argument that Congress intended Section 106’s waiver to
apply as broadly as possible. Whereas a short list of specific subsections
would indicate an intention by Congress to limit and narrow the waiver’s
application, a long list of general sections indicates a desire by Congress
for Section 106 to apply as broadly as possible. By using general section
references instead of specific subsection references, Congress intended
Section 106 to act as a broad brushstroke applying where ever possible
within the listed sections. Just as a cascade of floodwaters will find their
way into each crack and crevasse, Congress intended Section 106’s
waiver to find its way to every possible and applicable crack and crevasse
within the listed sections.
Finally, the omission of Section 541 from Section 106 further supports
the presumption that Congress intended Section 106 to apply to Section
544(b)(1). By omitting Section 541, Congress showed that it was selective
and deliberate in deciding to which parts of the Bankruptcy Code Section
106 should apply. Thus, Congress intended Section 106 to apply
throughout the entirety of Section 544—including subsection (b)(1).
Viewed in this light, Congressional intention behind Section 106 is
quite clear. First, by enacting amended Section 106 and using broad,
general section references, Congress intended to broadly and completely
eliminate sovereign immunity where ever it applies within the listed

144. See supra Section II(b)(2).
145. See id.
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sections. Second, because Congress was selective in determining to which
sections the waiver should apply and because Section 544 is listed within
the list of affected subsections, Congress clearly intended to completely
eliminate sovereign immunity for the entirety of Section 544. Therefore,
holding that Section 106’s waiver alters the substantive requirements of a
Section 544(b)(1) action and completely removes the sovereign immunity
barrier from such actions conforms with the underlying Congressional
intent behind Section 106.
The Seventh Circuit would counter such analysis by arguing that any
consideration of Congressional intent is improper when the language of
the statute at issue is plain and unambiguous. But, to side with the Seventh
Circuit is to acknowledge fundamental ambiguity between Sections
544(b)(1) and 106. If one agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion as
to the actual creditor requirement, the result is substantial ambiguity as to
how Section 106 applies. If the actual creditor requirement cannot be
overcome, Congress had no reason to waive sovereign immunity for
Section 544(b)(1) because absent an additional, applicable law specific
waiver Section 106 would have no effect on Section 544(b)(1). Thus, the
plain language-based conclusion of the Seventh Circuit creates substantial
ambiguity as to what affect, if any, Section 106 has on Section 544(b)(1).
In the face of such ambiguity, a court should look beyond the plain
language of the statute and consider Congressional intent. As stated
above, the correct analysis of congressional intent leads to the conclusion
that Section 106 was meant to alter the requirements of Section 544(b)(1)
and abrogate sovereign immunity with respect to Section 544(b)(1)’s
derivative cause of action.
C. Practical and Policy Considerations
Finally, practical and policy considerations support a finding that
Section 106’s waiver alters the requirements necessary to bring a Section
544(b)(1) action and completely removes the sovereign immunity barrier.
First, holding that Section 106’s waiver alters the substantive
requirements of a Section 544(b)(1) action more properly aligns the
Bankruptcy Code with the central goal of bankruptcy: to provide for the
fair and equal distribution of the debtor’s assets among all entitled
creditors.146 Prior to the enactment of Section 106, sovereign immunity
acted to provide the government substantially greater protection in
bankruptcy proceedings than all other creditors. Sovereign immunity
allowed the government to both participate in the distributions of a
bankruptcy proceeding while also being exempt from liability. This
146. See supra Section II(a).
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superior protection is inherently at odds with a bankruptcy system
designed to provide for the fair and equal distribution of the debtor’s
assets to all entitled creditors. As the Ninth Circuit stated, it is inherently
unfair to allow the government to participate in the distributions of a
bankruptcy case while at the same time shielding itself from liability via
sovereign immunity. By removing the sovereign immunity barrier for
most bankruptcy actions, Congress sought to level the playing field and
place the government on more equal footing with all other creditors. If
Congress intended to equalize the government’s standing with all other
creditors via Section 106, it is contradictory to turn around and hold that
the government retains its superior protection (via sovereign immunity)
for Section 544(b)(1) actions.
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s alternative of requiring additional,
“applicable law” specific waivers is impractical. In the Seventh Circuit’s
view, to allow Section 544(b)(1) claims against the federal government,
Congress would have to grant a separate, specific waiver to the underlying
law of a 544(b)(1) action. For Congress to broadly allow Section
544(b)(1) claims against the federal government, Congress would have to
pass a specific waiver for every state law that could possibly facilitate a
Section 544(b)(1) action. This is simply impractical and unworkable.
Furthermore, if, as in the Seventh Circuit’s view, the actual creditor
requirement cannot be overcome, Congress would have to pass
additional, specific waivers that waive sovereign immunity generally, not
just in the bankruptcy context, in order to allow Section 544(b)(1) actions
against the federal government. Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
would prevent Congress from waiving sovereign immunity solely in the
bankruptcy context. The better alternative is to simply give Section 106
the power Congress intended and allow it to completely remove the
sovereign immunity barrier for all of Section 544 actions, including
Section 544(b)(1) actions.
The Seventh Circuit also inappropriately attempted to use its own fear
of derivative liability as a justification to overturn Congressional
authority. The Seventh Circuit argued that allowing Section 106 to
completely remove the sovereign immunity barrier for 544(b)(1) actions
would overexpose the federal government to liability based upon laws
that the federal government cannot control. While the Seventh Circuit is
accurate that derivative causes of action expose the government to
liability for laws it cannot control, Congress has the power and authority
to expose the federal government to such liability if it desires. In fact,
Congress did just that in enacting the amended Section 106. The Seventh
Circuit may have reservations and fears of such liability, but these
concerns cannot trump a Congressional decision on the matter as
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Congress has authority to abrogate sovereign immunity as it sees fit.147
The Seventh Circuit is wrong to use such an argument to undermine valid
Congressional decision making.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit misapplied the governmental presumption
regarding waivers of sovereign immunity. As the Seventh Circuit stated,
the Supreme Court has instructed against expanding the scope of the
government’s liability beyond the point where its consent is unequivocal.
But, as both the Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s stated, Section 106’s waiver
is clear, unambiguous, and applies to Section 544(b)(1). Thus,
Congressional desire to waiver sovereign immunity for Section 544(b)(1)
actions is unequivocal. The only issue for debate is how this wavier
affects the underlying requirements necessary to bring a Section
544(b)(1) action. For all the reasons stated above, Congress clearly
intended Section 106’s waiver to apply to the underlying law of a
544(b)(1) action and to alter the requirements necessary to bring a
544(b)(1) claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit properly held that Section 106’s abrogation of
sovereign immunity applies to the underlying law of a Section 544(b)(1)
action and acts to alter the substantive requirements necessary to bring a
Section 544(b)(1) action. This holding is appropriate based upon proper
textual interpretation, an analysis Congressional intent, and other policy
and practical considerations.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is correct based upon a holistic view
of the Bankruptcy Code which interprets the requirements of Section
544(b)(1) in light of Section 106. Such a view supports the conclusion
that Section 106 acts to alter the substantive requirements of Section
544(b)(1) action. The Ninth Circuit’s holding also better complies with
the cannon of statutory interpretation because it errs against interpreting
statues to be internally contradictory or interpretations that hold part of a
statute to be meaningless. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is correct
based on an analysis of Congressional intent. Both the history and text of
Section 106 support the conclusion that Congress clearly intended Section
106’s waiver to broadly and completely eliminate sovereign immunity
within all of the listed sections, including the entirety of Section 544.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is correct based upon both practical
and policy considerations because it furthers of the central goals of
bankruptcy law and avoids creating a practically unworkable system.
At the end of the day, the power to waive federal government sovereign
147. See supra Section II(c).
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immunity is squarely within the hands of Congress. Within Section 106,
Congress has clearly exercised such power to level the playing field
among entitled creditors in bankruptcy actions. If Congress didn’t want
its wavier to apply to Section 544(b)(1) actions, it could have simply
excluded it from Section 106’s enumerated list. Furthermore, if Congress
is unhappy with the effect of Section 106, it can repeal or amend Section
106. Fear for the consequences of such a waiver are irrelevant where
Congress’ intent is clear and unambiguous.
Therefore, Congress’s intent within Section 106 is clear: Sovereign
immunity is waived for all Section 544 actions, including Section
544(b)(1) actions. As required by the Constitution, the courts should stop
setting up road blocks where none are needed or desired by Congress and
let the United States bankruptcy system serve its intended purpose.
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